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1. Introduction 
Some Asian currencies in the wake of flotation of the Thai baht in 2 July 1997 collapsed, 
and the crisis spread to other countries in the Asian region. The currency crisis triggered the 
financial crisis. Thus, the Asian crisis (currency and financial crises) covered most of the 
East-Asian countries by the early 1998. The Asian economies have experienced the drastic 
reduction of the economic growth. In particular, to Thailand, Indonesia and Korea (called as 
supported-countries by the IMF), the international organization (International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, Asian Development Bank) and the G-7 countries provided the 
assistance together with the program of economic reform. Diagnoses of the seriousness of 
crisis and the appropriate recovery process are important because they enable a government 
to evaluate its policy effects (i.e., the IMF-supported program) and implement additional 
policy if required. 
 Few papers for diagnoses exist. Most of them diagnose it by independently using each 
measure of GDP, the exchange rates and the stock prices as well as previous researches. Ito 
(1999) and Yoo and Moon (1999) diagnosed no smooth recovery in the real economy and 
claimed that the IMF programs that do not address the crux of the matter were ineffective 
and costly. Berg (1999) stated that the issues of short-run stabilization receded as early as 
1999. However, Cerra and Sweta (2005) found that while growth recovered fairly quickly 
after the crisis, there was evidence of permanent losses in the levels of output in all the 
countries. Lane et al. (1999) presented a preliminary assessment that the developments 
toward recovery had been much more favorable in Thailand and Korea that had been able 
to keep to the programs, but Indonesia had been still facing more difficult task in part 
because of the severity of the underlying political crisis. Kho and Stulz (2000) found the 
negative impact of IMF bailout announcements on the bank stock indices. In contrast, Lau 
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and McInish (2003) found the positive impact on the individual bank stock returns and on 
the multiple event dates. No research diagnosed the Asian crisis by using the composite 
measure reflecting the change of fundamentals (GDP, exchange rates and stock prices). The 
people’s welfare can reflect the changes of fundamentals through people’s consumption and 
then will become one of composite measure.  
  A welfare measure was provided by Lucas (1987) and Obstfeld (1994). They 
measured compensations that would leave consumers indifferent to a decline in economic 
growth and an increase in economic instability. Miyakoshi, Okubo and Shimada (2006) 
refer to both types of compensation (for the decline in economic growth and the increase in 
instability) as the ‘welfare cost of stagnation’ and the model as the ‘Lucas–Obstfeld model’. 
The welfare costs based on utility will equal the costs that people are willing to pay to 
prevent the stagnation. Then, we can evaluate whether the cost of the policy to prevent 
stagnation, which a government would finance from tax revenues, is higher than the welfare 
cost of stagnation. The practical use of measuring this cost has been explored by Miyakoshi, 
Okubo and Shimada (2006).1 Their paper has proposed an alternative measure of costs to 
the Lucas–Obstfeld model, which can evaluate: (i) whether the policy was implemented in 
a timely fashion, (ii) whether the policy cost was expensive compared with the cost of 
stagnation, and (iii) whether the policy implemented was effective or whether an additional 
policy is required. Their model is widely applicable by replacing the costs of stagnation 
with the costs of crisis. 
   The purpose of this paper is to measure dynamically the welfare cost, investigate the 
                                                 
1 However, Lucas and Obstfeld did not define the cost of stagnation. Rather, their concern 
was with the latter compensation (the cost of the economic instability) and they did not 
provide any analysis of the cost of stagnation: they only derived the formulation for the cost 
of stagnation. This also applies to work by Dolmars (1998), Krusell and Smith (1999), 
Storestetten et al. (2001), Beaudry and Pages (2001), and Pallage and Robe (2003). 
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effects of and the recovery process of the 1997 Asian crisis, and evaluate the 
IMF-supported programs We deploy Miyakoshi, Okubo and Shimada (2006)’s model to 
Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Hong Kong.  
 The paper finds: (i) the ‘whole cost (ratios) per quarter’ of crisis are evaluated large 
for all countries: 30% of the quarterly consumption in the starting period of crisis for 
Thailand, 50% for Indonesia, 36% for Korea, 18% for Malaysia and 39% for Hong Kong; 
(ii) the dynamic process of the ‘cost (ratios) at period t’ in Thailand, Korea and Malaysia 
quickly converges to 40% right after the crisis, reflecting the effectiveness of the policy; but 
the cost for Indonesia and Hong Kong remain still high at now, suggesting that the 
additional policy is required; (iii) the IMF-supported programs for Thailand, Indonesia and 
Korea have been implemented right after the cost hits peaks in each country, implying the 
quick program implementation; (iv) the policy cost of the IMF-supported program is not 
expensive compared with the corresponding welfare cost, suggesting the agreement of the 
program in each country.  
 This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the Lucas-Obstfeld 
Model and the alternative model proposed by the Miyakoshi,Okubo and Shimad (2006). In 
Section 3, we describe the data set. In Section 4, we diagnose the 1997 Asian crisis. Section 
5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Economic Model  
Lucas-Obstfeld Model 
Miyakoshi,Okubo and Shimad (2006) provide two models: the Lucas-Obstfeld Model and 
an alternative model. Detail derivations are given in their paper. First, we describe the 
former one. The representative agent lives infinitely and maximizes an expected utility 
 4
function V by choosing real consumption Ct at time t. The agent has preferences specified 
by: 
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where β∈(0,1) is a constant discount factor and γ>0 is the constant coefficient of relative 
risk aversion. Here, consider a pure exchange economy with no production, no storable 
goods and no borrowing. Then, the optimal consumption Ct for an agent is subject to 
exogenous income It in each period and hence is equal to its income: Ct = It for all t.  
 Assume a class of exogenous income and hence optimal consumption streams Ct 
with trend and cycle components, given by: 
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where µ is the growth rate of consumption and ln zt ~ N(0, σ2). In addition, assume that an 
agent has rational expectations, which implies that an agent knows those moments, and then 
is maximizing an unconditional expectation of utility (1): the subscript of time t is not 
attached on V in (1). Owing to the property of the log-normal distribution, E(zt•exp(–σ2/2)) 
= 1, the mean consumption is: 
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where the mean consumption at t = 0 is λ.  
 Thus, Lucas and Obstfeld assumed that the stagnation process of exogenous income 
(consumption) can be expressed by constant moments over time of the distribution of 
consumption, λ, µ, and σ2, and that an agent has rational expectations.  
  Under the above setup, we can calculate the indirect utility given the consumption 
process described by (2) and denote it by V(λ, µ, σ2|γ,β).This is derived as follows: 
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 We define that the period of Asian crisis outburst is the next period to the peak period 
for consumption series after the third quarter of 1997 for all Asian countries, considering 
the Asian currency crisis on July 2 1997. We partition the whole sample (1990:Q1 to 
2004:Q3) into two sub-samples by the outburst of the Asian crisis: the crisis periods 
including the crisis outburst and the pre-crisis periods excluding it. 
We consider two economies. One is called the crisis economy in which consumption 
growth µ C and its variance σC2 are calculated based on the data in the crisis periods. We 
denote the resulting indirect utility as ),|,,V( 2CC βγσµλ C . The other is called the 
hypothetical economy (i.e., the economy without crisis), which is based on expected 
consumption under the assumption that the growth rate and variance in the pre-crisis period 
are maintained during the crisis periods. The resulting indirect utility 
is ),|,,V( 2HH βγσµλ H . The intuition behind this comparison is shown in Figure 1. 
Owing to (3), the λH is mean consumption at the beginning of the crisis period for the 
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hypothetical economy. However, in actual, the consumption falls gradually during several 
periods after the crisis outburst, as denoted by dot line. We replace the dot line by a solid 
line for analytical convenience. Thus, we compare both economies depicted by the solid 
lines in the crisis periods. Although γ and β differ between both economies, we assume that 
they remain constant over time at ),( βγ . 
 
[INSERT Figure 1] 
 
We define the ‘whole cost’ of crisis as follows. 
 
Definition 1. The ‘whole cost of crisis’ is given by λ*, which satisfies the following 
equation: 
 
),|,,(),| ,*,( 2H
2
C βγσµλβγσµλλ HHCC VV =+ , (5) 
 
where the subscripts C and H denote the crisis and hypothetical economy, respectively. 
The key concept relating to the ‘whole cost’ of crisis is the following. The consumption 
parameters are different between the crisis (C-ECO) and the hypothetical economies 
(H-ECO). Consumer preferences, given by ),( βγ , transform the difference in 
consumption parameters into a difference in utility levels. The ‘whole cost’ of crisis is 
measured by the compensation, uniform across all periods, required to leave consumers’ 
utility indifferent between two economies. The ‘whole cost’ implies the cost from the 
beginning of the crisis to the future. 
The calculation of the cost λ* is given by: 
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An Alternative Model: The Dynamic Welfare Cost 
Assume that the crisis economy for consumption can be expressed by the time-varying 
intercept and slope as follows: 
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 We assume that an agent has myopic rational expectations, which implies that an 
agent knows the moments of the distribution of only today t’s consumption parameters, σ2, 
at (λt) and bt (µt ). Moreover, an agent expects (or believes) these moments of today t to 
continue forever for future consumption. Thus, based on today t’s information, an agent 
obtains the conditional moments for today t and for future consumption (i.e., for the crisis 
economy). The indirect utility function of (4) conditioned on today t’s information includes 
the subscript of time t. 
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 At period t, an agent gets these parameters and computes indirect utility from period 
t to the future, based on the coming information at period t. Here, we compare this ‘indirect 
utility at period t’ with the ‘indirect utility at period t’ for the hypothetical economy 
mentioned in the Lucas-Obstfeld model. The ‘cost at period t’ of crisis is given by λt*, 
which satisfies the following equation: 
 
 ),|,,(),| ,,( 2H,
2
C,, βγσµλβγσµλλ HtHttCttCt VV =+ ∗ , (9) 
 
where the subscripts C and H denote the crisis and hypothetical economy, respectively. The 
parameters for the crisis economy are changed period by period, whereas the parameters for 
the hypothetical economy are the same and constant over each period, as in the 
Lucas-Obstfeld model. The λH,t is the exception, because it is an intercept of consumption 
and it changes at period t. 
 Then, an agent re-computes the ‘cost at period t’ of crisis period by period, based on 
the updated information.  
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Keeping the variance constant in the crisis period but letting the consumption intercept and 
growth fluctuate, the agent recomputes the ‘cost at period t’ of crisis, relative to the 
hypothetical economy. The ‘cost at period t’ measures the cost from period to future and 
hence is different period by period.  
 Figure 2 is a schematic diagram that describes this idea, which summarizes our 
alternative model. An agent knows only the present period (T1)’s intercept λC,T1 and slope 
µC,T1 in (7) from information at period T1, expects these parameters λC,T1 and µC,T1 will 
continue forever. On this basis, the agent constructs the crisis economy from period t to the 
future. Thus, the crisis economies expected from period T1 to the future and from period T2 
to the future will be different each other and the costs at T1 and T2 will be also different 
period by period. The ‘cost at period t’ calculated in this way may be literally called a 
dynamic cost of crisis, in contrast to a ‘whole cost’ computed from the beginning of crisis 
to the future by the Lucas-Obstfeld model. In general, the cost at period t will be higher at 
the start and lower at the end of the crisis period. 
 
[INSERT Figure 2] 
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 By using a ‘cost at period t’, we can evaluate: (i) whether the policy was 
implemented immediately in the period when the highest welfare cost arose, (ii) whether 
the cost of the implemented policies was expensive compared with the welfare costs of 
stagnation, and (iii) whether the cost of stagnation decreased gradually—that is, whether 
the policies were effective—or whether additional policies are required, which will be 
ascertained by determining the current welfare costs. These specific exercises cannot be 
undertaken under the existing frameworks, including under the Lucas–Obstfeld model.  
 Although an alternative model can compute the cost period by period, how can it 
derive the whole cost of crisis that occurred in an era? We may consider the ‘cost at the 
period t’ as the ‘whole cost’ of crisis. However, as an agent has myopic rational 
expectations about the crisis economy expressed by time-varying parameters, he or she 
cannot predict the future economy. Thus, the ‘cost at the starting period’ of the crisis cannot 
correctly capture the ‘whole cost’ from the starting period to the future. On the other hand, 
it is a very bold and implausible assumption that an agent has rational but not myopic 
rational expectations of the crisis economy expressed by time-varying parameters. 
Moreover, it is technically difficult to derive the ‘whole cost’ and the ‘cost at period t’ by 
applying the Lucas–Obstfeld model to an economy expressed by constant parameters. Thus, 
the two cost measures are derived based on the two different conceptions of the crisis 
economy. However, we propose a compromise. If we value a long-run viewpoint, it is 
natural to assume a stagnation economy with constant growth over time and instability. In 
contrast, if we value a short-run viewpoint, the assumption of a crisis economy with 
time-varying parameters is more natural. In this sense, when we value the long-run 
viewpoint and evaluate the ‘whole cost’ of crisis that has occurred in an era, the 
Lucas–Obstfeld measure may be appropriate.  
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 To calculate the costs of crisis in Lucas- Obstfeld model, we proceed as follows. 
First, by using data for each sub-sample (the pre-crisis or the crisis period), we estimate the 
parameters (λ,µ, σ2) for each economy and then use the preference parameters ),( βγ  
employed by Pallage and Robe(2003). These parameter estimates are reported in Table 1. 
Second, we measure the costs of crisis, which are reported in Table 2. Third, we calculate 
these costs for varying values of the parameters ),( βγ to do the robustness check. 
These results are reported in Table 3. 
 
 
3. Data and the 1997 Asian Crisis 
The data used in this paper are quarterly data mostly from the first quarter 1990 to the third 
quarter 2004 (i.e., 1990:Q1 to 2004:Q3), which gives 59 observations but changes 
depending on the data availability for each country: Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
and Hong Kong. To estimate the parameters (λ, µ, σ2) for consumption in the model, we use 
total consumption expenditure for households (line 96f, measured in national currency) 
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).2 The per capita series is constructed by 
dividing consumption expenditure by the number of population (line 99z).3 These data are 
converted to real values by using the consumer price index (line 64, for general prices in 
2000): the money unit is a Baht for Thailand, a Rupiah for Indonesia, a Won for Korea, a 
Ringgit for Malaysia and a Hong Kong Dollar for Hong Kong. For the preference 
                                                 
2 The consumption series is non-seasonally adjusted. It is seemingly important to delete the 
seasonal effects, while the sample size is small for all countries and then the seasonal 
adjustment reduce the sample size. In addition, for each country, we compare the 
non-seasonal adjusted data between both consumption paradigms. Then, the seasonal 
adjustment or non-adjustment is not so important.   
3 The data for population is on annual base, and then we assign the increase of the annual 
data to the quarterly data at a constant growth rate. 
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parameters ),( βγ employed by Pallage and Robe(2003), we calibrate the model.  
Figure 3 plots consumption in logs for each country, which suggests a drop in the log 
of consumption (which reduces consumption growth) around 1997:Q3. The crisis outburst 
is 1997:Q3 for Thailand, 1998:Q1 for Indonesia, 1997:Q4 for Korea, 1998:Q1 for Malaysia 
and 1998:Q1 for Hong Kong. Our objective is to estimate the cost of the Asian crisis during 
the crisis period by comparing it with the hypothetical economy. This specification of the 
crisis outburst seems appropriate, and consistent with previous research, including Corsetti, 
Pesenti and Roubini (1999a,b). Therefore, we do not implement a formal test for structural 
change between two sub-periods. 
 
[INSERT Figure 3] 
 
4. Estimation Results and Discussion for Costs 
Lucas-Obstfeld Model 
 The parameters for consumption in a pre-crisis period and a crisis period are estimated 
by applying a Maximum Likelihood methodology to the whole sample: 
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where DUt=1 if t≥TB (that is, TB=crisis outburst period) and 0 otherwise. In Table 1, the 
parameters in both the pre-crisis and the crisis periods are estimated and denoted as the 
estimated parameters for the hypothetical economy and the crisis economy. An agent 
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perceives that the estimated parameters in both periods are the consumption parameters for 
both economies. All parameter estimates for consumption are obviously significant at the 
1% level (not shown in Table 1). 4 All the null hypotheses of H1: λH=λ C ;H2:? H =?C ;H3: 
σ2H =σ C 2 are rejected except for Malaysia (?) and Hong Kong (σ2). That is, the difference 
in consumption growth and variance between both economies is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. In Thailand, the estimated quarterly consumption growth rate falls from 
1.30% in the hypothetical economy to 1.06%. The variance of the error term in the log of 
consumption decreases from 0.0009 to 0.0002. The estimate of initial consumption at 
1997:Q3 is 13,202 baht for the hypothetical economy and the one at 1997:Q3 for the crisis 
economy is 10,085 baht. The initial consumption of the crisis economy drastically dropped. 
These imply the drop of λH and λC in equations (5) and (6). See Figure 3. The instability of 
σ2 reduces in the crisis periods except for Korea. This result will be due to the policy effects 
of each country.  
 
[INSERT Table 1] 
 
 How much is the estimated ‘whole cost’ of crisis according to the model? As 
explained in Section 3, to measure these costs, we use the same preference parameters as 
Pallage and Robe (2003) does. For both economies, we use 0.98 as a base value for β of 
quarterly data, since they use 0.96 as a typical discount factor of annual data for developing 
countries. We also use the moderate risk-aversion level at ?=2.5.  
As Table 2 shows, by using these parameters in equation (4), for Thailand, we obtain a 
utility level of –1.698E (–05) for the hypothetical economy (H-ECO) and one of –1.861E 
                                                 
4 The data for dotted line in Figure 1 are omitted for estimation. 
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(–05) for the crisis economy (C-ECO). This implies that crisis reduces utility. Our cost 
measure λ* enables us to convert the reduction in the utility level into a level of 
compensation in national currency. The cost of crisis is 3,948 baht. In general, it is difficult 
to identify whether the cost is large or small. However, this amount is 30% of the initial 
level of consumption ?H (13,202baht). This ratio 30% is easy to identify the large, which 
shows the relative amounts and hence an actual impact. These ratios are large for all 
countries: 30% for Thailand, 50% for Indonesia, 36% for Korea, 18% for Malaysia and 
39% for Hong Kong. 
 
[INSERT Table 2] 
 
Which country paid the higher costs than other countries? Considering the ratios of the 
cost /?H, the supported-countries by the IMF (Thailand, Indonesia and Korea) burdened 
larger costs: in particular, the ratio for Indonesia is the highest,50%. However, the one of 
Malaysia is the lowest, 18% and about one-third of that of Indonesia. These findings are 
similar to those of the previous papers in a qualitative sense, while our paper is different in 
that we provide the money measures in a quantitative sense and a people’s welfare point of 
view by using the welfare costs. Then, the advantage of our model can reveal how much 
people could pay the costs to prevent the crisis, which should be equal or less than this 
welfare cost, and can compare seriousness in people’s mind of defects among countries. We 
will have to investigate the causes for the different costs between Indonesia and Malaysia in 
future. 
 To check the robustness of the results, we calibrate the preference parameters in (1). 
We use γ = 2.0, 2.5, 5.0 and β = 0.97, 0.98, 0.99, which encompass the range of parameter 
values used in previous research (see, e.g., Pallage and Robe, 2003). Note here that γ>0 
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implies risk aversion. In Table 3, for Thailand, the ratio of costs /?H ranges from 28% to 
35% at β =0.99 as γ decreases and from 26% to 28% at γ=5, as the theoretical analysis with 
µH>µC are shown in Miyakoshi, Okubo and Shimada (2006).5 Varying the parameters, the 
maximum is 35% and the minimum is 26%. The minimum ratio is still large than 26%, 
compared with the ratio 30% at γ=2.5 and β =0.98 in Table 2. The ratios are robustly larger 
for the other countries. In particular, the ratios for the IMF-supported countries (i.e., 
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea) are larger than 35% at base values. In addition, the even 
minimum ratio 19% of Indonesia and 25% of Korea is larger than the maximum ratio 
18.1% of Malaysia.  
  
[INSERT Table 3] 
 
An Alternative Model : Dynamics of Welfare Costs  
 The estimation results for α0, α1, β0, β1 and other parameters in model (7) by the 
Kalman filter algorithm for the time varying parameter model are obtained. The estimation 
results are shown in Table 4. 6 Moreover, the estimated a t and b t over time, actual values 
log C t and the estimated a t+ t⋅b t values over time are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. By 
using the estimated parameters for Thailand in Table 4, the estimated parameters over time 
are a t =1.9342+0.7901 a t-1 and b t=0.0026+0.7434 b t-1 , where all estimated parameters are 
significant at the 5% level. However, the dynamics of parameters converge to lim t→∞a t 
=1.9342/(1-0.7901)=9.21 and lim t→∞b t =0.0026/(1-0.7434)=0.01. Also, the dynamic 
                                                 
5 Also, the theoretical analysis with µH<µC in Miyakoshi, Okubo and Shimada (2006) 
shows βλ ∂∂ ∗ / <0 and γλ ∂∂ ∗ / >0, which is confirmed in the findings for Malaysia. 
6 A formal test of qa(b) = 0 involves nonstandard statistics, and hence the associated t-value 
are meaningless. 
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process of those parameters are shown in Figure 4, and thus the time-varying parameter 
estimates with the growth component and with the intercept component can capture the 
actual values of consumption, as seen in Figure 5. On period T1 seen in Figure 3, an agent 
can know the moments of distribution of the consumption process on period T1, that is, a 
T1(=lnλ T1-σ2 /2) , b T1(=ln(µT1+1) ) and σ in (6), and expect these parameters to continue 
forever (i.e., constant forever), and computes the cost on this basis. But at period T1+1, the 
agent recomputes a different cost, based on the actual values of a T1+1 , b T1+1 and σ on period 
T1+1. 
 
 [INSERT Table 4, Figure 4 and Figure 5] 
 
As seen in Figure 4, the estimated growth parameter µCT(=exp(b T)-1) and the intercept 
component of consumption λCT (=exp(a T+σ2 /2)) for the crisis economy are respectively 
less than those of the hypothetical economy in all periods, which induce the higher cost of 
crisis. On the other hand, the finding that the instability σ2(=0.0153x0.0153 in Table 4) of 
the crisis economy for Thailand is smaller than that of the hypothetical economy σ2 
(=0.0009 at H-ECO in Table 1) induce the lower cost. 
 We should compute the ‘cost at each period t ‘ by applying equation (10). As seen in 
Figure 6, the dynamic cost ratio for Thailand (IMF-supported country as well as Korea and 
Indonesia), i.e., the cost at period T / (λHT on period T for the hypothetical economy), hit 
uncountable-high cost in 1997Q3-1998Q1 (not shown in Figure 6 and due to φA>1) but 
immediately decreases to 53% in 1999Q3 and now converges to 50%. For Korea, the cost 
hits uncountable-high in 1997Q3 for only one period, but disappears at 1% in 1998Q3 one 
year after. However, after then, the cost increases gradually and stags at 40%. In this sense, 
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the IMF-supported program to rescue these countries seems to have been effective. The cost 
for Indonesia did not hit the high level right after the crisis outbursts, while the cost did not 
show a sign of decreases and approaches to 100%, suggesting the IMF-supported program 
is not effective in this country. For Malaysia which is not a IMF-supported country (rather, 
refused a supported program), the cost is high right after the crisis outburst but rapidly drop 
down at 46% in 1999Q1 and decreasing more. The decrease suggests that its own policy, 
i.e., the capital control, was effective.7 Finally, the cost of Hong Kong is not high right 
after the crisis outburst, but after then increases gradually and hits 60% in 2004Q3, showing 
no confirmed sigh of decreases. Now, in 2004Q3, the cost is still more than 40% for all 
countries, which needs more additional policy implementation.  
 
[INSERT Figure 6] 
 
 Next, we investigate whether the policy (IMF-supported program) was implemented 
immediately at the period that the highest cost arose. The peak cost at more than 500% 
continues during 1997Q3-1998Q1 for Thailand and only in 1997Q4 for Korea, i.e., right 
after the crisis outburst. However, the costs for Indonesia increase in gradually creeping, 
requesting the additional programs. Table 5 shows that the IMF-supported program starts 
right after the crisis occurs in all three countries. In this sense, the IMF-supported program 
for each country was implemented right after the crisis outburst.  
 Whether was the cost of the IMF-supported program implemented expensive in 
                                                 
7 Malaysia more strictly controlled the stock markets to prevent the speculative attacks 
during the crisis than the pre-crisis period. In fact, in 1998, Malaysia imposed a range of 
foreign exchange and capital controls that substantially insulated Malaysian financial 
markets from external influences and effectively closed down the offshore ringgit market. 
See IMF (1999, pp.180-185) in detail. 
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comparison with the size of the welfare costs? That is, if an SDR 2.9 billion Stand-By 
Arrangement for Thailand approved by the IMF (seen in Table 5) could rescue the Thai 
economy immediately (i.e., maintain its hypothetical economy), would people agree to pay 
this policy cost?. In 1998Q2 of Figure 6, the welfare cost is paid, 37,926 bath (276%) per 
quarter forever. If the policy cost of SDR 2.9 billion in Table 6 can maintain the 
hypothetical economy, how many quarters should people pay 37,926 bath per quarter to 
finance SDR 2.9billion ? That is, (Policy costs /people’s number on 1998Q2) /How many 
months?=the welfare cost, and then, (SDR 2.9billion X 56.34 baht /0.05923 billion people) 
/37,926 baht per quarter =0.07 quarters8. It is very short period compared with forever, 
meaning the policy cost is cheap and people will agree to pay the policy cost. For Indonesia, 
in 1998Q1, the welfare cost is 111,138 rupiah (11%) and the policy cost is SDR 7.3 billion. 
(SDR 7.3billion X 11121 rupiah /0.20304 billion people) /111,138 baht per quarter =3.6 
quarters. Similarly, for Korea, in 1998Q1, the period for people to pay is, (15.5billion SDR 
X 1847.54 won /0.04581 billion people) /1,223,880 won per quarter =0.51 quarters. The 
period for people to pay the policy cost is at most 3.6 quarters for three countries. It is a 
very short period, compared with the ‘forever‘, since the welfare cost is paid ‘forever’. In 
this sense, the policy cost of the IMF-supported program seems to be cheap.  
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has measured dynamically the welfare cost, investigated the effects of and the 
recovery process of the 1997 Asian crisis, and evaluated the IMF-supported programs for 
Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, by deploying Miyakoshi, Okubo 
                                                 
8 The data for exchange rate per SDR is complied from IFS(line aa.zf). 
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and Shimada (2006)’s model.  
 The paper finds: (i) the ratios of ‘whole cost’ to the consumption level of the 
hypothetical economy are large for all countries: 30% for Thailand, 50% for Indonesia, 
36% for Korea, 17.7% for Malaysia and 39% for Hong Kong; (ii) the dynamic process of 
the ‘costs at period t’ in Thailand, Korea and Malaysia converge to around 40% right after 
the crisis, reflecting the effectiveness of the policy. However, the costs for Indonesia and 
Hong Kong increase gradually toward 100%, suggesting that the additional policy is 
required; (iii) the IMF-supported programs for Thailand, Indonesia and Korea have been 
implemented right after the cost hits peaks in each country, implying the quick 
implementation of the program; (iv) the policy cost of the IMF-program is not expensive 
compared with the corresponding welfare cost, suggesting that the program in each 
IMF-supported country will be agreed.  
  The findings of the paper support the previous qualitative analysis with the 1997 Asian 
crisis. However, the results of this paper are different in that we first provide the money 
measures in a quantitative sense, a people’s welfare point of view by using the welfare costs, 
and the dynamics inspection.  
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Table 1. Estimated Parameters for Consumption 
Country Crisis λ ? σ2 H1:χ2(1)λH=λC 
H2:χ2(1) 
?H =?C  
H3: χ2(1) 
σ2H =σ2C 
Thailand      
H-ECO 97Q3 13,202 0.0130 0.0009 331.47 6.30 5.56 
C-ECO 97Q3 10,085 0.0106 0.0002   
Indonesia       
H-ECO 98Q1 965,616 0.0193 0.0052 6.13 406.29 12.42
C-ECO 98Q1 996,317 0.0033 0.0002   
Korea       
H-ECO 97Q4 1,665,633 0.0211 0.0003 512.34 234.44 10.19
C-ECO 97Q4 1,393,492 0.0129 0.0022   
Malaysia       
H-ECO 98Q1 1,698 0.0103 0.0028 67.39 0.08 4.36
C-ECO 98Q1 1,375 0.0107 0.0010   
Hong-Kong       
H-ECO 98Q1 31,353 0.0069 0.0013 59.28 38.99 0.50
C-ECO 98Q1 27,229 0.0009 0.0010   
Notes: H-ECO and C-ECO denote the hypothetical and the crisis economy. The value of lambda is 
measured in national currency. The critical value of χ2(1) distribution is 3.84 at 5% level. 
 
 
Table 2. Welfare Costs of the Crisis (?=2.5, ?=0.98) 
Country Indirect Utility  Welfare Costs 
 H-ECO C-ECO Level λ* Ratio (λ*/λH) % 
Thailand -1.698E(-05) -1.861E(-05) 3,948 30 
     
Indonesia -1.418E(-08) -2.699E(-08) 487,229 50 
     
Korea -8.069E(-09) -1.052E(-08) 594,993 36 
     
Malaysia -3.760E(-04) -3.687E(-04) 301 18 
     
Hong Kong -4.946E(-06) -6.969E(-06) 12,186 39 
     
Notes: The cost is measured in national currency. E(-0X) denotes 10-X . See notes of Table 1. 
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Table 3. Welfare Costs of the Crisis based on Various Preference Parameters 
Country  ?  
? 0.97 0.98 0.99 
Thailand    
2 29% 31% 35% 
2.5 28% 30% 32% 
5 26% 27% 28% 
Indonesia    
2 42% 62% 113% 
2.5 36% 50% 83% 
5 19% 25% 33% 
Korea    
2 35% 41% 35% 
2.5 32% 36% 32% 
5 25% 26% 25% 
Malaysia    
2 17.9% 17.6% 17.0% 
2.5 18.0% 17.7% 17.3% 
5 18.1% 18.0% 17.9% 
Hong Kong    
2 32% 41% 67% 
2.5 31% 39% 60% 
5 27% 32% 42% 
Notes: The shaded number is the one at ?=2.5 and ?=0.98 in Table 2. In particular, the number for 
Malaysia is denoted to one place of decimals. 
 
 
Table 4. Estimated Parameters in (6)?
? ? ? ? σ α? α? q a β? β? q b 
????????? ????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
? ??????? ??????? ?????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ??????
?????????? ????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
? ??????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????? ??????
?????? ????? ??????? ???????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ??????
???????? ????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
? ??????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ??????
????????? ????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ??????? ???????
? ? ??????? ??????? ?????? ??????? ?????? ??????? ??????? ??????
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Table 5. IMF Supported Program Right After the Crisis: Date and Finance 
Thailand 
1997:August 20 The Board approves an SDR 2.9 billion Stand-By Arrangement for Thailand and 
releases a disbursement of SDR 1.2 billion. 
October 17 The Board reviews the Stand-By Arrangement under the Emergency Financing 
Mechanism procedures. 
November 25 Thailand issues a Letter of Intent detailing additional measures. 
December 8 The Board completes the first review under the Stand-By Arrangement and 
disburses SDR 600 million. 
1998:February 24 Thailand issues a Letter of Intent describing further measures. 
Indonesia 
1997:November 5 The Executive Board approves a Stand-By Arrangement for Indonesia 
authorizing drawings of up to SDR 7.3 billion, and disburses SDR 2.2 billion. 
1998:January 15 Indonesia issues Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies on 
additional measures. 
April 10 Indonesia issues a Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies 
on additional measures. 
May 4 The Board completes the first review under the Stand-By Arrangement and disburses SDR 
734 million. 
June 24 Indonesia issues a Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial 
Policies on additional measures. 
July 15 The Board completes the second review of the Stand-By Arrangement, disbursing SDR 
734 million, and approves an increase in IMF financing under the Stand-By Arrangement by SDR 
1 illion. 
Korea 
1997:December 4 The Board approves an SDR 15.5 billion Stand-By Arrangement for Korea and 
releases a disbursement of SDR 4.1billion. 
December 18 The Board concludes the first biweekly review of the Stand-By Arrangement and 
releases a further SDR 2.6 billion, activating the IMF’s new Supplemental Reserve Facility. 
December 30 The Board approves a request by Korea for a modification of the schedule of 
drawings, bringing forward part of the amounts originally scheduled for February and May 1998, 
but without changing overall access to IMF resources, and disburses SDR 1.5 billion. 
1998: January 7 Korea issues a Letter of Intent describing additional measures. 
January 8 The Board concludes the second biweekly review of the Stand-By Arrangement and 
disburses SDR 1.5 billion. 
February 7 Korea issues a Letter of Intent on additional measures. 
February 17 The Board completes the first quarterly review of the Stand-By Arrangement and 
disburses a further SDR 1.5 billion. 
Note: This table is made from Annual Report 1998, p.23-32, IMF. 
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Figure 1. Hypothetical and Crisis economies 
? ? Log(C t)  
        ? ? H-ECO 
  l???? H )              
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Note: PCP (H-ECO) and CP (C-ECO) denote the pre-crisis and the crisis periods (the 
hypothetical and the crisis economy), respectively. The t=0 denotes the crisis outburst 
period. Parts of intercept, -(1/2)σ2H and -(1/2)σ2C , are neglected because they are negligible. 
 
Figure 2. Hypothetical and Crisis economies using the Alternative Model  
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Note: see a note of Figure 1
 26
Figure 3. Per Capita Consumption in Logarithm (in national currencies) 
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 Figure 4.Estimated log(λt) and µt over Time: Hypothetical and Crisis Economies 
( Estimated log(λt) ) 
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(Estimated µt) 
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Figure 5. Estimation vs Actual Values of Consumption for the Crisis Economy 
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Figure 6. The Ratio of Costs at Each Period 
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